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Even More Complex After All These Years: 
What the Complexity of the “How?” Question of Tailoring 
Claim Scope Has to Say About the “Who?” Question
??????Pi
Kevin Emerson Collins*
In On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, published in 1990 in the Columbia Law 
Review,1 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson made several important contributions to patent 
scholarship.  Complex Economics added a strong, knowledgeable voice to the then-nascent 
argument that the dynamic costs attributable to the reach of today’s patents into tomorrow’s 
technology is a critical variable in the calculus required to optimize patent protection.2  It 
mapped out an industry-by-industry approach to the optimal tailoring of claim scope, pointing 
to factual differences between the innovation processes that drive technological progress in dif-
ferent industries and demonstrating how these factual differences could lead to a need for legal 
differences in permissible patent breadth.3  It backed up its argument with historical evidence 
of the different effects that broad patents have had on technological progress in different in-
dustries.4?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that created the discretion through which examiners and courts could adjust claim scope.5  
Given the importance and breadth of its contributions, Complex Economics has unsurprisingly 
served as a platform for a rich and diverse literature in the twenty years since it was published. 
*Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law in Saint Louis.  I thank the participants in the Patent 
Scope Revisited: Merges & Nelson’s “On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,” 20 Years After conference 
held at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law on September 23–24, 2010.  I thank Mark Janis, in particu-
lar, for organizing and hosting the conference.
1. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV?????????????
2. Compare W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND ECONOMIC WELFARE???????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????with 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
rower at the margin in certain industries to promote competition among many players for post-patent progress 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON????????????
3. Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 880–84.
4. Id. at 884–908.
5. Id??????????????
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In this brief comment, I attempt neither an even-handed assessment of Complex Econom-
ics on its merits nor a comprehensive review of its diverse intellectual progeny.  I put on 
blinders and focus on a narrow issue.  I identify one facet of the complexity inherent in the 
tailoring of patent scope that Complex Economics did not discuss, and I point out the wrinkle 
that it creates for both Merges and Nelson’s project and a line of contemporary scholarship 
that builds on Complex Economics????????????????????????????????????????????????????
“policy levers.”???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of tailoring claim scope—Given the redundancy in the doctrinal mechanisms that could be 
used to tailor claim scope, how should the tailoring of claim scope be accomplished in any 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????Complex Economics on enable-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
cised is too narrow.  In large part, the narrowness follows from the fact that the enablement/
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
party.  The Supreme Court established that claim construction is an issue for judges,? usher-
ing in a decade-long dispute over claim construction methodology in the Federal Circuit that 
vividly demonstrates claim scope’s dependence on claim construction.8  The Federal Circuit 
discovered enablement’s long-lost twin in the application of the written description require-
ment to original claims.9  Most recently, the Supreme Court highlighted the potential impact 
of the section 101 doctrine of patent eligibility on claim scope.10  
A good start on the needed work of cataloging the array of doctrines that courts can today 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and Mark Lemley.11??????????????????????????????????????????????????Complex Economics, 
generalize them, and enrich them with an analysis of institutional competence.  They argue 
???DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMELY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT ???????
??? ?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
8. See generally????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????en banc???????????????????????????
9. See generally? ???????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????? ???????????en banc?????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10. Bilski v. Kappos???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
courts can tailor claim scope have been on the rise, the doctrine of equivalents—in both its rights-expanding 
and “reverse,” rights-contracting forms—seems to have atrophied as it is today rarely dispositive of the extent 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???? ??????????
The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the publication of Complex Economics, the Federal Circuit has only once held that a triable issue of material 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????
11. BURK & LEMLEY, supra????????
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????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
can bring patent protection closer to its optimum,12?????????? ???? ?????????????????? ?????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
protection through the adjustment of doctrinal policy levers.13  In the course of their much 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
ized as policy levers for tailoring claim scope.14
While the increase in the number of potential scope-tailoring doctrines or policy levers 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????this?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????this plaintiff and this defendant but also, 
in the course of doing so, to establish clear precedent that can be followed in similar cases in 
the future.  It is the need for clarity in the choice of which redundant, scope-tailoring policy 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
well, more complex than has been acknowledged.15  The redundancy among policy levers 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
levers that could be adjusted to affect claim scope, how should the tailoring of claim scope 
???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????
This system-design question was already a theoretical problem in the narrow enablement/
?????????????????Complex Economics.  Why use a claim validity doctrine, like enable-
ment, to narrow a patentee’s rights in one situation and an infringement doctrine, like the 
????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
thus expanding or contracting claim scope, than Merges and Nelson did.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????
posited, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 1, at 839–42, 852, and the authority of courts to use policy levers 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
doctrines, BURK & LEMLEY, supra????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????id. at 
118–22, the “abstract ideas” strand of section 101 doctrine, id. at 122–24, many of the distinct sub-doctrines 
??????? ???? ????????? ??? ???????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???????????????????? id. at 124–25, the element-by-
element analysis, id?????????????????????????????????????????????????id??????????????????????????????????????????
equivalents, id?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
claiming.  See, e.g., infra???????????????????????????????????
15. Technically, the redundancy creates a system-design problem whether or not courts tailor claim scope in an 
????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion has become more pressing as the redundancy among the policy levers has grown.  Some 
new redundancies have already been recognized by the Federal Circuit.  For example, the 
Federal Circuit has openly pondered why it is appropriate to use written description to in-
validate overbroad claims in one case and claim construction to narrow claim scope in an-
other.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
further confusion.  For example, consider the juxtaposition of two recent cases in which the 
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
embodiments in the written description.  In computer software cases, the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly held that purely functional claim language triggers the section 112, paragraph 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
paragraph 2.??? In a biotechnology case, the Federal Circuit addressed a claim that it acknowl-
edged was drafted in purely functional language, but it failed to even consider the relevance 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????18  Rather, it concluded that the functional 
claim language, coupled with a lack of any structure that was capable of performing the 
claimed function in the written description, rendered the claim invalid under the written de-
scription doctrine of section 112, paragraph 1.19  
Why these two radically different doctrinal routes were taken in two cases that both pre-
sented the same policy problem—functional claim language without any structural embodi-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
system-design perspective.20?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
though using claim construction to narrow the claim would leave the claim valid and enforceable against other 
?????????? ????????????? ?Compare???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ????id??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion rather than written description as the relevant policy lever might lead to different outcomes.  LizardTech, 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a petition for rehearing en banc????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
??????????????????????????????????????
???? ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????en banc??
19. Id.  
20. Two possible answers are unsatisfying.  First, unlike the software claim, the biotechnology claim did not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????id??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
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as a path-dependent result of how the parties to the litigation framed the issues at hand.  More 
on this below.21???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
identical substantive restrictions on claim scope, this redundancy simply detracts from the 
coherency of patent doctrine.  In the more likely of possible worlds, however, this redun-
dancy leads to similar cases receiving dissimilar treatment because each doctrine requires a 
different quantum of structural disclosure to justify a claim of a particular scope.22  
To this point, the lesson to be drawn in this comment from the existence of the system-
design question might simply be that, if the Federal Circuit takes on the challenge of using 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
competence of the Federal Circuit to be the primary driver of the patent-tailoring process. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to tailor patent protection on an industry-by-industry basis because “[t]he litigation process 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
manner.23  In brief, the argument is that the adversarial system will make parties with narrow 
interests in upholding their patents into effective purveyors of information about the eco-
nomics of patent protection in a given industry.  If I’m the owner of a biotechnology patent, I 
have incentives to provide the court with the data supporting the urgent need for broader bio-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
incentives to provide the court with data demonstrating the costs of broader biotechnology 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to provide the information needed to establish in a clear, systematic way which of the redun-
dant policy levers should be used.  No party will ever argue that, as a matter of public policy, 
it would be best to have narrower literal claim scope and then to expand protection under the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
doctrine of equivalents or just-right literal claim scope with little effect from the doctrine of 
purely functional language.  Ariad Pharms, 598 F.3d at 1354–55.  Second, the biotechnology case arguably pre-
????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rule for “single means” claims is that they are categorically invalid, regardless of the substantive nature of the 
disclosure, In re??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on that ground.  For a more in-depth discussion of the redundancy of the written description doctrine and the 
restrictions on the use of functional claim language that led to congressional adoption of section 112, paragraph 
????????????????? ??????????????????????Tailoring Patent Scope with Disclosure Standards and/or Functional-
Claim Rules????????????????????
21. See infra???????????????????????????????????
22. See, e.g., supra?????????
?????URK & LEMLEY, supra?????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
iners can gain access to the needed information insofar as they argue in favor of judges and examiners exercis-
ing discretion in the shaping of claim scope on an industry-by-industry basis.
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
abandoned but enablement should be interpreted in a robust way so as to invalidate many 
patents, including the patent at issue in the litigation.  The self interest of litigants in Article 
III courts will likely not prove to be an effective vehicle for advancing the public interest 
in a coherent patent regime for tailoring claim scope.  The system-design question requires 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
parties are usually only interested in providing information when the information is proba-
tive of whether or not a substantive end should be reached.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
question is yet further undermined because cases on appeal to the Federal Circuit rarely 
present a smorgasbord of the redundant policy levers from which the Federal Circuit could 
choose.  Cases are usually tracked or framed as, for example, either claim construction or 
written description cases by the time they reach the Federal Circuit.  The framing may exist 
from the beginning: it may result from the parties’ strategic choices in the pleadings.24??????
the framing may be an artifact of the manner in which the district court chooses to resolve the 
case.  In theory, the Federal Circuit could attempt to overcome the doctrinal frame in which 
a case is presented by performing its own analysis, using oral argument to raise issues that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????25?? ????????????????????
Circuit rarely demonstrates any interest in deviating from the parties’ framing of the issues.?? 
If the parties or the district courts possess the power to set the frame—if they can present to 
the Federal Circuit a single doctrinal policy lever that the court must opt either to pull or not 
to pull—then the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence on claim scope is likely to resemble 
a game of “whack-a-mole”???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in an uncoordinated fashion.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
fringer argued that the claims at issue were invalid under the written description doctrine, but they did not raise 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Federal Circuit opinions that track the arguments in the parties’ briefs in minute detail, even when the issues 
presented are pure issues of law like statutory construction.  See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
?????????????????????????????????????????en banc????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????
???? ??????????????????????An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent Pro-
tection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT??????????????available at http://www.patentlyo.
???????????????????????????
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an issue that neither Complex Economics nor its intellectual progeny has noted.  This ques-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
may not be an institution that is well positioned to establish clear rules that determine which 
of the many redundant policy levers that could be used to tailor patent scope should be used 
in any given case.  
